Are Scholars Neglecting Climate Change as a Foreign Policy Threat?

By Lucas Arnett

June 17th, 2019

In response to a poll question in December 2017, a majority of scholars of International Relations (IR) chose “Global Climate Change” (GCC) to be one of the three most important foreign policy issues of today. However, less than three percent of publications coded by Research Assistants (RA) at the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) project specifically study the environment.

TRIP Snap Poll X (Embedded in 2017 Faculty Survey) was the tenth in a series of questionnaires aimed at classifying U.S. scholars. RAs at the TRIP project have also compiled a database with every International Relations-related publication from 12 journals since 1980, known as the Journal Article Database (JAD).

Who are these scholars?

Of the 1565 scholars who took TRIP Snap Poll X, 385 identified GCC as one of the three largest foreign policy threats, along with Cybersecurity (248), and the Rising Power of China (275).

Gender

Female scholars are more likely to have chosen GCC. 29 percent of female scholars believe climate change is a major threat, compared to 21 percent of male scholars, and 20 percent of all scholars, according to TRIP data. More scholars who selected GCC are male, but only because there are considerably more male respondents (70 percent of all survey respondents). Also, the percentage of female respondents in the stratum of global climate change selectors is higher than the percentage of women in the sample. Gender minority data from the TRIP survey is not available.

 

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Figure 1 compares the percentage of women who selected GCC to the percentage of men who selected GCC in response to the question: “What are the three most important foreign policy issues facing the United States today?

Methodology

Scholars who use a quantitative approach are the most likely to view GCC as a foreign policy threat. 56 percent of scholars surveyed use qualitative analysis, compared to 25 percent who use quantitative analysis, and 9 percent use policy analysis. However, figure 2 shows that even though scholars who use quantitative analysis are outnumbered by scholars who use qualitative analysis, more of them believe GCC is a foreign policy threat. Among the stratum of scholars who selected GCC, 56 percent use a quantitative analysis method.

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Figure 2 shows the percentage of scholars who use each methodology who chose “Global Climate Change” as a response to “What are the three most important foreign policy issues facing the United States today?” in TRIP Snap Poll X. 

Paradigm

Feminist scholars believe GCC is a foreign policy threat than scholars who primarily employ any of the other paradigms. The majority of respondents do not use a paradigm, and the percentage of those scholars who selected GCC is only 24%. Once again, the largest group of scholars is not the one focusing on climate change. Surprisingly, only 20% of scholars who use the Marxist critique selected GCC as one of the three most important foreign policy threats. While Marx himself focused a lot on nature, it seems the critique named after him does not.

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Figure 3 shows which the Paradigm advanced by scholars who chose “Global Climate Change” as a response to “What are the three most important foreign policy issues facing the United States today?” in TRIP Snap Poll X. 

Social Ideology

When it comes to politics, “very liberal” scholars are the most likely to select GCC. Alarmingly, even among “very liberal” scholars, only 33% chose GCC; that means a majority of scholars in each ideological stratum did not think climate change was a top foreign policy threat. Within the stratum of scholars who selected GCC, the vast majority are socially liberal—more so than in the field as a whole. The average scholar that selected global climate change as an important issue is more politically liberal than the average scholar surveyed, and there’s a smaller percentage of both somewhat conservative and very conservative scholars.

Lucas4Figure 4 shows what percentage of scholars of each social ideology selected “Global Climate Change” as a response to “What are the three most important foreign policy issues facing the United States today?” in TRIP Snap Poll X.

Region of Focus

Perhaps unsurprisingly, scholars who study East Asia (including China) are more likely to select climate change as a foreign policy threat than scholars who study any other part of the world. China continues to be one of the largest polluters in the world, so that makes sense. But what’s more surprising is that only 13 percent of scholars who studied the Sub-Saharan Africa chose global climate change as an important issue, and there is a smaller percentage of scholars who study Sub Saharan Africa from the GCC stratum that in the larger sample of scholars. Since climate change disproportionately affects developing countries, especially those with deltas, peninsulas, coasts, or islands, as is often the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, one would expect scholars who are worried about climate change to pay closer attention, not less attention. The region still remains largely understudied. Also, no region of focus has a higher percentage of scholars who selected GCC that the sample as a whole, including the arctic.  

Lucas5Figure 5 shows what percentage of scholars who study each region chose “Global Climate Change” as a response to “What are the three most important foreign policy issues facing the United States today?”  

Views on Foreign Policy

As in the original sample, most scholars who selected GCC believe East Asia is the region of greatest strategic importance. Almost 35 percent of scholars who chose China also selected GCC, a rate higher than the average GCC response rate from the general sample. Unfortunately, only 62 of 1632 scholars selected the Middle East and North Africa, and not a single scholar selected Sub Saharan Africa, so it’s hard to know which mainstream scholars are paying attention to climate change.

Lucas6Figure 6 shows what percent of scholars chose “Global Climate Change” as a response to “What are the three most important foreign policy issues facing the United States today?” in each stratum of perceived foreign policy threat. Scholars were asked “Which area of the world do you consider to be of greatest strategic importance to the United States today?”

It seems scholars agree climate change is important, but aren’t thinking about it from a national security perspective, and perhaps as a result, neither do policymakers; President Trump’s 2017 National Security Policy omitted climate change entirely, and that’s dangerous.

Climate change and changing demographics are expected to “profoundly affect the availability of water resources in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA),” a region that’s already experiencing longer and more variable periods of droughts and rainfall events, according to a recent study. The region has already exceeded the water resources needed to supply food to its population, meaning governments have found themselves forced to ration water and import food.

In the next fifty years, Bangladesh could find itself almost entirely underwater, forcing its 164.7 million residents to flee. Low lying coastal plain regions, deltas, and islands face a higher risk, and could entirely disappear from the world map. Rising sea levels also threaten our supply of usable groundwater as saltwater seeps into our aquifers and eliminates the little drinking water we still have.

The field studying these effects, Environmental Politics, is relatively young and has core debates that are still “dynamic and rigorous.” Let’s just hope academics and policymakers pay attention to it before it’s too late. If we aren’t careful American academia and its readers could realistically find themselves blindsighted by the climate crises of tomorrow.

Lucas Arnett is a Research Assistant at the Global Research Institute on the TRIP project. He’s a rising sophomore at the College of William and Mary, and intends to double major in International Relations and History.

The Swan Song of Hong Kong: U.S. Regional Strategic Military Bases in Asia

By Marc Dion

June 11th, 2019

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U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf moored in Hong Kong in April 2019

In September of 2018, China denied USS Wasp a port visit in Hong Kong. While U.S. presence in Hong Kong is strong; the U.S. Navy alone normally visits between 60-80 times a year, this refusal of entry signals tensions between the U.S. and China. The Chinese Communist Party carried out the action, but it may have some traction within the American International Relations academy.

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Data used from TRIP Faculty Survey fielded in November 2017; questions 27, 31, 32, and 35

A TRIP survey fielded in November 2017 asked respondents “Should the United States have long-term military bases in the following countries?” and gave a list of 17 different countries in Europe, Latin America, and Asia. In Asia, respondents examined the U.S. military presence in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Hong Kong stands out as the only Asian country where the majority of respondents said no. There are many motivations behind why American International Relations scholars push for withdrawal from Hong Kong.

Popularity of Military Strategy

Military strategy has always been the lynchpin of U.S. foreign policy. However, scholars are less enthused about the use of military intervention. There is much more support for non-military strategies, such as making international agreements. The popularity of non-military based strategies does not always translate into success of non-military strategies, though. Military strategy in Hong Kong likewise comes with many problems.

Hong Kong is a Catch-22 for U.S. grand strategy: not involve itself in Hong Kong and leave Chinese influence in the South China Sea unmitigated, or provoke China and risk confrontation by remaining there with a military presence.

Hong Kong is a prime location to contain the Chinese sphere of influence. Hong Kong’s geostrategic importance for shipping in the South China Sea, as well as its long political history of being unique from the mainland make it an impactful place to limit influence from the source. Having a large military presence there would be offensive to the Chinese, allowing them to retaliate in par. However, not being there means leaving China’s influence unlimited, spreading further across the South China Sea. This is only further complicated by the history of Hong Kong and current movements in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong as a Political Hot Bed

The shift in interest in having a base in Hong Kong comes at a time where Hong Kong-Chinese relations are at a boiling point. Relations between the Special Administrative Region and the Mainland have been at their worst since 2014, when the student-led Umbrella Movement championed democracy against an ever-encroaching Chinese administration. While there have been steps by Hong Kong’s Legislative Council to quell these movements, there remains growing dissent towards the continued integration of Hong Kong back into China. The history behind this dissent is a story for another time, but here’s a link to a summary video by Vox explaining Hong Kong’s conflicted relationship with China.

The fear of getting embroiled in growing domestic dissent could be a potential reason why scholars believe that withdrawal is the best policy. As conflict continues to grow, it will be harder for the U.S. to explain its port visits. It also makes visiting the city riskier for servicemen.  

It is now harder to justify maintaining a long-term military base in Hong Kong. The era of Hong Kong’s geostrategic importance to the United States is coming to an end. At least, for International Relations Scholars.

 

Authors Note: This is a story very close to my heart. Growing up in Hong Kong during the Umbrella Movement, as well as enjoying the hot summer afternoons on Fenwick Pier (a former U.S. base in Hong Kong) were some of my favorite moments. This is a very brief and America-centric understanding of the issues discussed between Hong Kong and China. I implore you to explore more about this issue, especially after the events of this weekend.  

 

Marc Dion is a graduate of William & Mary’s class of 2019.  He majored in International Relations and minored in Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Marc has worked at TRIP for 2 years as a Research Assistant. His interests include organizational culture, U.S. foreign policy, and the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.

 

It’s Not All Fun and Games

By Peter Leonard

June 7th, 2019

USWNT_CelebratesThe USWNT Celebrates their First Place win as Captain Christie Ramponeraises the trophy at the 2012 CONCACAF Olympic Qualifiers.

The 2019 Women’s World Cup is underway, with opening festivities kicking off today, June 7th. The Cup is shaping up to be an exciting one – the United States, the favorite to win, has rising star Mallory Pugh, France is looking to win on their national soil, and New Zealand is looking to advance past the group stage for the first time. If one looks through all the fanfare, though, one finds that the World Cup has evolved from being more than just an international soccer match. The World Cup and its parent organization, FIFA, are now steeped in international politics, politics that affect all areas of FIFA’s decision-making.

Academics have talked about FIFA in relation to international politics before. Daniel Maliniak and Erik Voeten used TRIP data in a 2015 Monkey Cage article to see if the United States’ indictment of 47 FIFA officials was due in part to FIFA picking Qatar and Russia as host countries. The authors found that 62.8% of IR scholars supported the indictments, but “both scholars and the public think that the choice of Qatar and Russia as hosts increased the likelihood of the indictment.”

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It now seems that FIFA is sailing in smoother waters. The 2018 Men’s World Cup went off without a hitch – a combined 3.572 billion people (more than half the world’s population aged four and older) watched the Cup. Due to these good times, FIFA president Gianni Infantino was just reelected to serve a second term “by acclamation,” skipping the traditional FIFA voting process . Under his reign, Infantino claimed FIFA has gone from being “toxic, almost criminal to what it should be”. Infantinio even considered expanding the World Cup’s reach from 32 to 48 teams in the 2022 World Cup.

Maliniak and Voeten’s findings, combined with FIFA hitting its stride, prompted me to reexamine the original TRIP data to see if it could provide any insight in 2019. I used the TRIP Snap Polls which polled 655 international relations scholars. I was drawn to one finding in particular. Responding to whether awarding the U.S. the 2022 World Cup would’ve made an indictment more or less likely, 49.7% of respondents (a plurality) agreed that awarding the World Cup to the U.S. would have made indictments less likely.

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Flash forward to June 2018. On the heels of the Russian World Cup, FIFA announced that the U.S., Mexico, and Canada would host the 2026 World Cup. U.S. soccer officials saw the decision as a big win, especially after the U.S. did not qualify for the 2018 World Cup. FIFA said the financial impact was the primary motivator for its decision; U.S. officials promised the Cup would make $11 billion in profit. The aforementioned TRIP data, though, provokes questions about the authenticity of this claim. Awarding the Cup has been a historically cloudy and corrupt process. Letting the U.S. host a Cup could potentially ease international pressure (pressure that was primarily egged on by the U.S.) and further remove FIFA from the microscope. FIFA officials could not be blamed for factoring less international scrutiny into their decision-making calculus, especially when the organization is enjoying relative calm (at least for the moment).

Peter Leonard is a graduate student at William & Mary’s School of Education, where he is pursuing a degree in secondary education. He began working for TRIP in May of 2019.

How Do IR Scholars Talk About Africa?

by Henry Crossman

May 10, 2019

In the latest issue of Political Science, Yoonjin Song finds “the uneven distribution of research publications with respect to continents and countries may be a source of several biases that should be of concern to the [comparative politics] field.” The top two comparative politics journals focus on African countries in only 8 percent of published articles from 1990 to 2015. Of that 8 percent, five countries are the focus of three-quarters of the articles (326).

How does the International Relations (IR) sub-field compare? The Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) Project has coded all articles published in the top 12 IR journals from 1980 to 2017. Over the past 37 years, less than 6 percent of 8,743 IR articles were written with Sub-Saharan Africa as a region under study.

region

Why are studies on African countries published at a lower rate than studies about other regions? Do IR scholars study African politics differently compared with the rest of the IR sub-field?

To begin answering these questions, I analyze the sub-set of 520 articles that study African countries against the 8,743 IR articles in the TRIP database.  

What Regions Do IR Scholars Study Alongside Africa?

From 1980 to 2017, Sub-Saharan Africa – which includes 49 countries – is selected as a region under study for 6 percent of IR articles. Coders can select multiple regions for any given article, so the 520 articles that study Africa may also study other regions. Of these articles, 10 percent also have “global” selected as a region under study. This typically indicates an article with “a large-n study that includes a number of regions” that also contains a case study or focuses on Africa in greater depth.

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As Figure 1 shows, when Africa is one of multiple regions under study in an article, it is typically associated with the Middle East and North Africa or other parts of the Global South. This is a similar (if less sophisticated) finding to Song’s analysis of comparative politics journals, which finds that African countries were compared with other African countries in only 6 percent of the share of articles with symmetric dyads (326).  

What Do Scholars Study About Africa? Issue Area and Substantive Focus

Articles studying African countries also differ from the population of IR articles by issue area and substantive focus. TRIP defines issue area as “the primary issue area to which the article contributes,” and it is generally determined by the study’s dependent variable. As such, coders may only select one issue area for an article. Since the dependent variable is not an inclusive means for capturing the contents of an article, coders can also select a number of substantive foci, which offer more insight into an article’s substantive contribution and can cut across issue areas.

Figure 2 shows the top five issue areas for all IR articles and for articles with Africa as a region under study. International Security and Comparative Politics each capture about one-quarter of the articles about African countries. The percentage of comparative politics articles is higher relative to the set of all IR articles and the percentage of international security articles is slightly lower. Human Rights and International Political Economy (IPE) are studied at higher rates when Africa is a region under study relative to the set of all IR articles, while IR theory and U.S. Foreign Policy are studied about at lower rates.

fig2

Trends in substantive foci for African countries provide an explanation. Domestic politics and regime type, both national-level variables, are selected as a substantive focus at a higher rate for articles about African countries compared to the full sample of IR articles. Further, over 40 percent of articles about Africa study intra-state conflict. Together, the disproportionate selection of intra-state conflict and the high degree of domestic-level substantive focus explain why comparative politics and international security are the top issue areas for articles about African countries.

The higher percentage of IPE as issue area for studies about African countries can be attributed to the high levels of a substantive focus on  development, north-south relations, and foreign aid for African country studies relative to the full sample of articles.

Nearly 7 percent of articles about African countries are primarily focused on human rights issues. This result is reflected in the higher relative percentages of African country articles focusing on public health, NGOs, humanitarian intervention, gender, ethnicity and religion, and migration. Human rights as a top focus is consistent with the concerns and priorities of citizens in African countries, who more than any other category select health care and education as major concerns.  

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How is Africa Studied? Epistemological & Methodological Differences

What scholars study about African countries is different from the general population of IR articles. Does how scholars study Africa differ too? To explore this question, I look at epistemological and methodological differences between articles studying Sub-Saharan Africa and the full set of IR articles.

While Figure 4 shows that studies with a focus on African countries follow similar trends to the full sample, it also suggests that articles about Africa are relatively more positivist and less non-positivist relative to the full IR sub-field. This difference poses interesting questions for future research, as it may suggest less theory-building or less interpretivism for African or Global South countries.

fig4

The methodological differences are starker. Articles with African countries as a region under study use higher rates of quantitative and qualitative methods relative to the full sample of IR articles, and appear systematically less likely to use formal modeling, descriptive analysis, experiments or non-formal analysis.

Could these differences be a function of who is writing about Africa? Articles about Sub-Saharan Africa are slightly more likely to be written by women (21.9% vs. 18.5%) and more likely to be written by authors from non-U.S. institutions (36.3 % vs. 28.9%). These are both factors we know make scholars more likely to use qualitative methods. Data from TRIP’s faculty survey show women are more likely to use qualitative methods in their research than men (35.2% vs. 29.9%), and U.S. scholars are “more quantitatively oriented than most other national IR communities.”

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Studying Africa Matters

Earlier, I asked why studies on African countries are systematically under-represented among the top IR journals. One factor is the relatively small number of IR scholars that focus on African politics. Just over 5 percent of U.S. scholars surveyed by TRIP in 2017 selected Sub-Saharan Africa as the main region of the world they studied.

Second, the plurality of articles in top IR journals study the United States, and U.S. Foreign Policy is one of the most common issue areas selected. However, among articles studying African countries and at least one other region, the United States accounts for the smallest percentage at only 15 percent. This is reflected in scholarship: very few of the articles about African countries are categorized as U.S. Foreign Policy, relative to the full sample of IR articles. This suggests that U.S. relations with Africa is absent from current research on U.S. foreign policy.

In part, this is because scholars do not perceive Sub-Saharan Africa as an area of strategic importance to the United States. In TRIP’s 2017 Faculty Survey, 0.2 percent of scholars considered Sub-Saharan Africa to be of the greatest importance to the United States today. In fact, the regions that scholars believe to be of the greatest strategic importance are studied at a higher frequency than regions scholars do not believe to be as important.

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The persistence of failed states and humanitarian crises, paired with a rising middle class and powerful youth demographic necessitates taking Africa, and its politics, seriously. Yet, a recent report from the Atlantic Council identifies “a persistent misconception prevalent among the American public—and even many foreign policy  professionals—that Africa is largely irrelevant to US national security.” Despite few scholars perceiving Africa as the most strategic region for the U.S. today, looking forward scholars are beginning to recognize the region’s importance.

Sub-Saharan Africa is second behind East Asia in terms of change in IR scholars’ perception of most strategic region today and in 20 years, indicating that scholars believe Africa will become increasingly important for U.S. interests. This suggests IR scholars may study the region more.

This blog post has identified several areas for future research into how Africa is studied and what this might tell us about the IR discipline in general. In many ways, more questions have been posed than answers given: how do scholars talk about Latin America? East Asia? Civil war? Trade? What do these trends mean for the IR discipline and for our understanding of the world?

The bottom line is this: IR academics have an important role to play providing a nuanced, systematic and unbiased research on Africa. The ivory tower’s neglect of the region is cause for concern as concepts, data and findings from academia seep into the journals and op-eds that policymakers and the general public consume.

If you’d like to see more results from the Journal Article Database and surveys cited above, visit the TRIP Survey Data Dashboard.

Henry Crossman is a senior at the College of William & Mary, majoring in International Relations and minoring in Economics. He worked at TRIP for 4 years as a Research Assistant. His interests include African politics, development, and international security. The TRIP Project thanks Henry for sharing his diligence, intelligence, and sharp wit with us over the past four years.

Have a Little Faith: Scholars’ Confidence in World Leaders

by Sydney Boer

April 29, 2019

In the fall of 2017, the TRIP Project fielded SNAP Poll X about the state of global affairs. American scholars of international affairs shared their opinions on prominent heads of state and these leaders’ international policy. TRIP specifically inquired, “How much confidence do you have in each of the following leaders to do the right thing regarding world affairs?” Respondents could choose between the options of “a lot of confidence,” “some confidence,” “not too much confidence,” “no confidence at all,” and “don’t know.”

Two parts of this question can be interpreted very broadly: confidence and the “right thing.” The “right thing” is a subjective phrase because it can evoke different concepts and people hold different opinions about each of those concepts. Since TRIP collected these specific results from American scholars, one can assume an American-centric bias for this question. Therefore, the “right thing” might correlate with American political interests. Or, since the question specifies world affairs, the “right thing” could evoke a moral dilemma of the welfare of humanity. Are scholars more pragmatic or idealistic? In this case, scholars’ responses would differ based on their political ideology in economics and social issues. Most faculty in the survey identified themselves as somewhat liberal (31.82% in social issues, 41.85% in economics ) or very liberal (51.72% in social issues, 23.04% in economics). The next largest category included middle of the road perspectives. Given this, one can pinpoint their possible global priorities. Do they believe that the “right thing” for global affairs is multilateralism? Open markets? Democracy? Human rights?  TRIP did not test the extent of other factors influencing faculty responses, such as their specific research projects, experience outside the ivory tower, or their personal histories. Therefore, one can never 100% know the motives to these responses.

The notion of confidence also allows a lot of ambiguity. It depends on the personal and professional factors mentioned previously, as well as scholars’ level of skepticism. Because this question alludes to global leaders’ future actions, it requires some extrapolation. Because these academics have dedicated their careers to the study of international affairs, they are most likely aware that scholarly predictions are not always accurate. In fact, they are usually not. Therefore, one can expect scholars generally avoid choosing the extreme options of “a lot of confidence” and “no confidence.” It is also well known that International Relations is a male-dominated field. Male scholars, in general, happen to be more confident in their opinions and academic judgment than their female counterparts; although these confidence levels do not determine the correctness of their statements. Now that the question has been qualified, let’s move on to the data.

SNAP Poll X inquired about seven prominent heads of states for this question. First, the survey asked about the President of the United States, Donald Trump. 82.84% of respondents had no confidence in him doing the “right thing” in global affairs. In 2017, Trump was still relatively new at his position, so a lot of extrapolation went into this question. Some of his presidential actions swirling in the media at this time included talk of backing out of the Iran deal, cutting parts of the Affordable Care Act, cutting taxes, and sanctioning North Korea. Keeping in mind the factors of scholarly confidence, these results speak heavily to the scholarly consensus on President Trump. Because most respondents self-identified as the middle of the road, somewhat liberal, or very liberal, a bias against his conservative policies could have influenced these results. However, the extremity of this poll clearly depicts a strong scholarly consensus.

Next, TRIP inquired about Chinese President Xi Jinping. 44.73% of respondents had some confidence in his leadership, and 40.52% harbored “not too much confidence.” I found these results particularly striking due to the growing animosity between China and Western allies. The option “not too much confidence” is tricky because analysts cannot fully determine whether it means that they think the leader will not significantly alter the state of global affairs, or that the leader just will refrain from doing “the right thing” (whatever that may be). Regardless, compared to the results for President Trump, scholars had a much more favorable view of China’s leader. Although, I suspect that these numbers have declined since President Jinping’s term extension, tensions in the South China Sea, and the proliferation of the Belt and Road Initiative that have occured since the poll’s fielding in 2017.

In regard to Russian President Vladimir Putin, 65.78% of scholars has no confidence and 27.44% had some confidence that he would do the “right thing” in the international arena. International tensions fueled by the US and Russia were still high at this time over Ukraine, Crimea, the Black Sea, and even Syria to an extent. The majority of scholars are not going to praise President Putin anytime soon, but again, notice that scholars look more favorably upon him than President Trump.

The results for German Chancellor Angela Merkel were the most positive out of these seven prominent leaders. Almost half of the respondents at 49.14% had a lot of confidence that she would do the right thing in global affairs. 43.15% still had some confidence in her actions. For context, Chancellor Merkel has been a strong advocate of the EU embracing refugees. Her liberal refugee policies sparked criticism from EU citizens and EU policymakers. As witnessed through Brexit, the refugee crisis was a very contentious issue in this region in the mid 2010s. However, the mostly liberal scholars who took this survey supported her policies. These results shed light on scholars’ conception of the “right thing” in global affairs; in this case, they support a democratically elected policymaker who champions human rights, multilateralism, free trade, and environmentalism.

60.75% of scholars held some confidence in French President Emmanuel Macron’s abilities to do the “right thing.” Around 15% had a lot of confidence in him, and another 15% did not have much confidence. Because he had just been elected in the spring of 2017, scholars did not have many of his presidential decisions to make an educated opinion about the future of his presidency. Yet, they generally looked favorably on his foreign policy aspirations for free trade and a strong Western alliance. Given that he won the position over far-right politician Marine Le Pen, who ran on a position of populist nationalism, anti-immigration, and leaving the EU, these results suggest that scholars were much more pleased with a moderate political and economic leader than an extremely conservative one. From this data, scholars again seem to support leaders who support multilateralism.

Scholars held the second highest view of Canadian President Justin Trudeau. 35.85% held a lot of confidence in his foreign policy, and 48.21% held some confidence in it. Similar to Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Trudeau approached global affairs with an emphasis on multilateralism and social justice. He established a Low Carbon Economy Fund in response to the Paris Climate Agreement. He is a prominent supporter of gender equality, rights of native peoples, and the LGBTQ community under the Canadian Human Rights Act. Because of the correlation between his far-left social views and the respondents’ mostly liberal social views, I would expect the results to be mostly positive.  

Lastly, scholars shared their opinions on British Prime Minister Theresa May. 50.16% of scholars did not have too much confidence in her ability to do the right thing for global affairs. 28.89% harbored some confidence though. I believe these results were heavily influenced by Brexit, which propelled her into this position as Prime Minister. Prime Minister May and her relationship to Brexit are complicated because, as Britain’s leader, she is trying to comply with the British voters’ decision to leave the EU. Again, her efforts to successfully part with the EU are not a function of her foreign policy goals, but rather the will of the people and the democratic process. Based on the previous polls, scholars have confidence in leaders that support multilateralism and free trade. Because Theresa May feels it is her duty to withdrawal from an international organization, scholars would predictably not have good faith in her policy. Yet, 28.89% have some confidence in her, which could reveal some optimism about the Brexit process and British foreign policy as a whole.

These results about scholars’ confidence in prominent leaders’ ability to skillfully govern a globalized world suggest that scholars base their confidence on multilateralism, free trade, and generally liberal policies. The responses reveal a lot about what scholars look for in a global leader, as well as their notion of “the right thing” for the international community.

 

If you’d like to see more results from the surveys cited above:

TRIP X Snap Poll (Embedded in the 2017 Faculty Survey) (Fielded in October 2017): https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/questions/44

TRIP Survey Data Dashboard: https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/

 

Sydney Boer is a freshman at the College of William and Mary, majoring in International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies. She has worked at the TRIP Project for a semester as a research assistant. Originally from the Boston area, she is interested in sustainable global development, foreign languages, diplomacy, and improving the reputation of Patriots fans everywhere.
 

R-E-S-P-E-C-T? Examining Respect Trends in Academic Surveys

By Marc Dion

April 24, 2019

*the author highly recommends you enjoy this song while reading this article*

In our most recent Snap Poll fielded in October 2018, the first question respondents answered was “Compared with the past, how respected is the United States by other countries today?” While this is a pretty intuitive question, prompting scholars to compare perceived respect of the U.S., it carries a lot of assumptions that lead to some important questions. What time is the scholar comparing levels of respect to? Is respect a static measurement? Is it a quantifiable measure? I will explore some of these questions here.

What Time is the Scholar Comparing Levels of Respect to?

The question of what date respondents are comparing levels of respect to is a challenging question to answer. Are we comparing it to levels of respect during the Obama administration? Since when Donald Trump first entered office? The question leaves that vague, but we can determine an estimate of what respondents were thinking. We argue that the past compared to was before the Trump administration since a significant percentage of respondents answered that the US is less respected, implying that there must have been some large change assumed to have occurred between now and the comparison period. We argue that this large change is a change of presidency, since that can bring about a radical change in the perceived status of respect. A good way to further narrow down the time period can be to compare the social ideologies of the respondents.

Are Perceptions Only a Reflection of Political Preferences?

When looking at social ideology, we start to see a clearer picture. Conservatives tend to have more disagreement across the board, with almost 30% arguing that the U.S. is more respected today. However, liberals almost unanimously agree that the US is less respected. Therefore, we can suggest that the time compared to would have likely been during a liberal presidential administration, or where liberal values were being advocated more. Looking at times when we have posed the question previously, specifically during the Bush administration, this seems to be the case, where scholars respond with dissatisfaction when their party is not in power. As such, we conclude that people are likely comparing levels of respect to the Obama administration since he represents a liberal administration.

Are Perceptions due to Nostalgia?

When comparing responses to this question in 2004, 2006, and 2008, a strange picture emerges. Each time the question was posed, more than 90% of respondents responded that the U.S. was less respected. Why? I argue that there is an inherent nostalgia associated with the past, which makes scholars/academics feel as though the past is always better than the present. This is because they reflect on the bigger picture of the past and compare it to the minutiae of the present, making it seem as though the present is a worse reality of the past. Perhaps this is the larger reason for such disapproval of the present?

For Whom Does Respect Matter?

We know that 93 percent of IR scholars perceive the U.S. is less respected today relative to the past, but does respect matter in international relations? Three-quarters of self-identifying liberal and moderate IR scholars think the decline in respect for the U.S. is a major problem while less than 1 percent think the decline is no problem at all. Yet, self-identified conservative scholars are more than twice as likely than their liberal and moderate colleagues to view the decline in respect as a minor problem and are far more likely to see the decline as no problem at all.

Pew Research Center explored the public and their perceptions of respect through posing the same question that TRIP had (which was sourced from Pew). We see that there is less consensus in the public sphere: in 2017, less than 70% agreeing that the U.S. had lost respect, with 95% of those respondents saying it was a problem. These results show that the concern with respect is generally important to the public, but not seen as concerning the public as much as scholars.

What is Respect?

With all that in mind, it’s important to discuss what respect entails. We know that all of the TRIP survey respondents are U.S. scholars, therefore we can assume that there is a somewhat unanimous conception of respect, if you assume that U.S. culture is somewhat unified. We will operate under the assumption that U.S. culture is at least somewhat unified due to how we perceive values of respect as being quite similar due to a similar upbringing and education background. While this does not assume that there is no diversity of culture in the United States, we do argue that conceptions of respect are developed through shared communities, and since many communities blend together, all conceptions of respect are somewhat similar.  

Respect in the U.S. seems to have a lot of ties to personality politics, where the U.S. President is the symbolic carrier of respect in the United States. As such, choices made by the President have large implications on perceived respect. These choices then are compared to societal and academic status quos that align closely with perceived ideals of rational actors. Therefore, when a President challenges the status quo with their policy choices and is characterized as an irrational actor, they are cast as having lessened the respect of the U.S. This leads to a larger conversation though, one that cannot be easily summarised into a blog post. Regardless, we seek to start a conversation about what respect means in politics, and how societal forces can impact perceived respect, and even challenge how respect is used to credit or discredit politicians.

In conclusion, in the wise words of Aretha Franklin, “R-E-S-P-E-C-T, Find out what it means to me.” Me being the U.S. academy, of course.

For further reading, check out this link.

If you’d like to see more results from the surveys cited above:

TRIP X Snap Poll (Embedded in the 2017 Faculty Survey) (Fielded in October 2017): https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/questions/44

TRIP XI Snap Poll (Fielded in October 2018): https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/questions/45

TRIP Survey Data Dashboard: https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/

 

Marc Dion is a senior at the College of William and Mary, majoring in International Relations and minoring in Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. He has worked at TRIP for 2 years as a Research Assistant. His interests include organizational culture, U.S. foreign policy, and the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.

An Ideological Divide? Reassessing the Public-Expert Gap on National Security Threat Perception

By Aidan Donovan

April 10th, 2019

International Relations scholars disagree with the American public on crucial national security issues like cybersecurity, terrorism, and nuclear weapons. While the American public is fairly evenly distributed along the ideological and educational spectrum, IR scholars are highly educated and the majority consider themselves to be liberal on social and economic issues.

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The ideological imbalance in International Relations must be considered when studying public-expert gaps. On some issues, IR scholars may think similarly to the public and simply arrive at different conclusions based on their ideology. On other issues, we may find strong evidence of a persistent gap between scholars and public opinion, regardless of ideology. A closer look at the differences between conservative and liberal IR scholars could provide needed insight on the public-expert divide.

The Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project’s 2017 Snap Poll includes responses from 1,395 IR scholars at U.S. colleges and universities. In our sample, though the majority of scholars identify as liberal, 181 scholars identified as (somewhat or very) conservative on economic or social issues. The large sample of IR scholars allows us to examine the ideological divide within the academy and assess the origins of the significant public-expert divide on national security issues. Below, I examine survey data on several relevant foreign policy issues to explore divergences in public-expert attitudes and the ideological divide among academic experts.

Cyberattacks

71 percent of Americans think cyberattacks from other countries are a major threat to the United States. A 2017 Chicago Council survey indicates that Americans perceive the threat of cyberattacks on par with the threats of international terrorism and the North Korean nuclear program; all three are viewed as a critical threat by about three quarters of Americans surveyed. This threat perception is consistent across parties: 73 percent of Republicans and 78 percent of Democrats see cyberattacks as a critical threat.

According to TRIP data from our 2017 Snap Poll, 52 percent of IR scholars think cyberattacks from other countries are a major threat to the United States. 56 percent of conservative scholars and 52 percent of liberal scholars think cyberattacks are a major threat, indicating that this perception is independent of ideology. 41 percent of conservative scholars, compared to 36 percent of liberal and moderate scholars, consider cybersecurity one of the three most important foreign policy issues facing the United States today. Similarly, 46 percent of conservative scholars and 49 percent of liberal and moderate conservative scholars consider the issue one of the three most important foreign policy issues facing the United States over the next ten years.

The ideological divide works in opposite directions for the public and scholars, but each is within the margin of error. The perceived threat of cyberattacks does not depend on ideology, as conservative and liberal scholars, similar to the public, generally agree that it is a serious foreign policy issue. A majority of both scholars and the public think cyberattacks are a major threat. While the public is more concerned, this aligns with our generally alarmist attitudes, supporting the conclusion that cybersecurity is a rare national security issue with common ground between conservatives and liberals, and experts and the public.

ISIS

Three-quarters (74 percent) of the American public viewed ISIS as a major threat in 2017, but less than one out of six scholars agreed. Americans considered ISIS the second-biggest international threat to the United States, behind only cyberattacks from other countries. In the Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, 62 percent of Americans rated the “Islamic militant group known as ISIS” as a major threat to the United States. Concern over ISIS may be declining, but it is still more than four times higher compared to IR scholars.

The salience and shock of international terrorism, and particularly ISIS, is more powerful on the general public than on IR scholars. The attributed motivation and social categorization of terrorist actors shape our understanding of and response to terrorist incidents. This public lens shapes government response, as we see substantial concessions after up to half of all suicide terrorist campaigns. The public-expert divide on the threat of terrorism thus has important policy implications.

According to TRIP data from 2017, only 14 percent of IR scholars think ISIS is a major threat to the United States. Conservative scholars were slightly more likely to view ISIS as a major threat, with a five point difference (19 versus 14 percent) between conservative and non-conservative scholars.

Conservative scholars are twice as likely to rank international terrorism as one of the three most important foreign policy issues facing the United States today: while only 19 percent of IR scholars overall consider international terrorism one of the three most important foreign policy issues, 34 percent of conservative scholars rank international terrorism this high. A nearly identical difference is present when we ask scholars about threats in the near future. 17 percent of all IR scholars consider international terrorism one of the three most important foreign policy issues over the next ten years, and conservative scholars are more than twice as likely as other scholars to report this (29 versus 14 percent).

There is a significant difference between conservative and other scholars on the perceived threat of ISIS and the significance of international terrorism to foreign policy. However, even conservatives, who tend to be far more worried by terrorism, are more than four times less likely to view ISIS as a major threat than the public. Ideology seems to influence beliefs (directly or indirectly) on international terrorism, but this does not explain the public-expert divide on the threat posed by ISIS and international terrorism generally. The divide may result from the additional foreign policy information scholars can access and their enhanced ability to process this complicated information.

Iran Nuclear Deal

In October 2017, one quarter (27 percent) of Americans surveyed by SSRS (for CNN) thought the U.S. should withdraw from the multilateral agreement intended to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. When TRIP polled IR scholars in the same month, just 4 percent approved of President Trump’s proposal to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement.

While the question was posed to the public without mention of President Trump, withdrawal from the agreement, popularly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, is typically framed in connection to Trump. As a result, the significant proportion of respondents supporting the nuclear deal appears to be a direct effect of support for President Trump generally. Of those who approve of President Trump, 46 percent think the US should withdraw. Of those who disapprove, just 16 percent think the US should withdraw.

While less than 4 percent of scholars approved of President Trump’s proposal to withdraw from the agreement, there is a significant gap along ideological lines. Less than 1 percent of moderate and liberal scholars support leaving the agreement. This is unsurprising, as scholars generally support international agreements and oppose President Trump’s international proposals. On the other hand, one quarter (24 percent) of conservative scholars surveyed support leaving the agreement. Scholars are more likely to support the Iran Nuclear Deal than the public, although conservative scholars are less likely to do so than other scholars. The ideological divide may be a consequence of conservative scholars’ slightly lower support for international institutions and agreements.

Overall, there is a small ideological gap among experts for these key national security issues. However, the gap between the public and experts is much larger and appears to be unexplained by ideological differences. It is important to consider the ideological leanings of IR scholars, and while on some issues this appears to exacerbate the public-expert divide, the academy’s ideological imbalance does not explain the divergent perceptions of foreign policy issues between experts and the public.

Foreign Aid: Scholars Stand their Ground

By Sydney Boer

March 25th, 2019

In fall 2015, the Obama administration continued to spearhead a liberal world order. The US led many counterterrorism efforts, denuclearization initiatives, and agreements to address climate change, signaling to the world of its global leadership role. International Relations (IR) scholars had little clairvoyance to the sweeping changings in US foreign policy that would occur with the election of Donald Trump in the following years. However, their opinions about US foreign aid and involvement would not sway with this political change.

In the September 2015, TRIP fielded Snap Poll VII asking IR scholars in the US their opinions on whether the US government should increase foreign aid to developing countries. Results show that a strong 72.7% of scholars believed the United States government should increase foreign aid contributions to developing countries.

Despite social and economic ideological differences, US scholars appeared to agree that the Obama administration should at the very least continue its foreign aid initiatives. The administration’s agenda and scholars’ attitudes seemed to move in tangent. It is possible that scholars influenced the administration’s policy, but it is also possible that foreign policy influenced scholar’s views. The Obama administration was comprised of many experts and academics, who might have swayed foreign policy in line with the scholarly community’s views. The administration could have also used public opinion to inform themselves on general foreign policy decisions. On the other hand, one could argue that this phenomenon was caused by the United State’s general foreign policy of multilateralism and global involvement over the last century. Therefore, a national bias could be at play. However, the following surveys demonstrate consistency in scholars’ views during the Trump Administration.  

Fast forward to the present day, and the Trump administration has pursued, with varied success,  an “America First” foreign policy. Domestic partisan divisions had increased dramatically since the first cited poll in 2015. In October 2018, TRIP fielded a survey titled Snap Poll XI: What Experts Make of Trump’s Foreign Policy. TRIP asked scholars what advice they would give the US government regarding China’s increasing aid and investments in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

39.01% responded that the US should increase foreign aid to compete with China. In the same vein of global leadership, 33.89% responded that the US should collaborate with China on foreign aid and investments. Finally, 22.07% responded that the US should ignore China’s activity and  continue with their existing programs. Combining these percentages, 94.97% of experts believed that the United States government should either increase or maintain their global economic involvement.

The goal of this policy in the context of China would presumably be to implement soft power through aid and investments to maintain the US’s leadership status in Asia and deter China’s growing regional power. Although these responses differ along economic ideology more than the previous questions, with very conservative experts tending to recommend decreasing US involvement, the vast majority of scholars maintained their support of the US in a global order. Despite the growing public support of an increasingly isolationist American foreign policy, scholars did not concur with arguments for deglobalization.

The results of these surveys demonstrate the soundness of the scholar community in the face of dramatic political change. Despite the rise of nationalism and populism in the US and around the Western world, scholars still believe that a prosperous American future includes a global agenda. Underlying these results lies the assumption that US can use foreign aid as a soft power mechanism to cement America’s global leadership status. The inflexibility of experts to these growing forms of populism speaks to the theoretical and empirical inviability of this political ideology as a international soft power tool. If the people researching and analyzing the field of international relations believe that the US should continue to involve itself full force in the globalized world, then American politicians should perhaps reconsider their agenda for America’s future.

 

If you’d like to see more results from the surveys cited above:

TRIP Snap Poll VII (Fielded in September 2015): https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/questions/40

TRIP Snap Poll XI (Fielded in October 2018): https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/questions/45

TRIP Survey Data Dashboard: https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/

 

If you’d like to read more work from TRIP on this topic:

Parajon, Eric, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael Tierney. “There Really is an Expert Consensus: Multilateralism Still Matters,” Lawfare. Jan 18 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/there-really-expert-consensus-multilateralism-still-matters.

 

Sydney Boer is a freshman at the College of William and Mary, majoring in International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies. She has worked at the TRIP Project for a semester as a research assistant. Originally from the Boston area, she is interested in sustainable global development, foreign languages, diplomacy, and improving the reputation of Patriots fans everywhere.

Sanctions: Overused and Understudied

By Henry Crossman

March 18th, 2019

The killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the direction of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in October 2018 sparked international outrage and demands that the U.S. government formally punish the Saudi regime by imposing sanctions. 68 percent of likely voters in the U.S. and 76 percent of international relations (IR) scholars surveyed contemporaneously believe the U.S. should target financial sanctions against Saudi officials involved in Khashoggi’s death.

Figure 1: IR Scholar Policy Recommendations

Following Saudi Arabia’s alleged violation of international norms against freedom of the press and extrajudicial killings, significant majorities of the U.S. public and IR scholars believed sanctions to be the most appropriate response for the U.S. government.

Why did voters and scholars coalesce around sanctions?

Democracies use sanctions to punish bad actors for violations of liberal international norms. A mechanism short of military action, sanctions inflict financial or reputational harm to the violator to deter future violations, without causing lasting economic damage to the norm-enforcer or escalating a crisis between two actors. Generally faced with low public support for conflict, particularly in situations in which the public does not see transgressions as threatening the state’s security, sanctions are a common solution to addressing violations to behavioral norms while avoiding armed conflict.

The number of IR publications concerned with sanctions is among the lowest compared to other substantive foci. However, that only 1.5 percent of IR articles published in top journals over the last 35 years focus on sanctions is not evidence of convergence among scholars. Rather, IR scholars are split nearly evenly (47.7 percent to 51.4 percent) as to whether placing sanctions on other countries is an effective approach to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. This disagreement is in itself interesting; IR scholars overwhelmingly agree on a number of issues from the benefits of free trade to the effects of climate change, yet are evenly split on the question of sanction effectiveness.

Figure 2: IR Scholars & Effectiveness of Sanctions

In the Khashoggi case, a different picture emerges among IR scholars.

Three-fourths of IR scholars recommend financial sanctions against Saudi officials, a policy prescription second only to naming and shaming the Saudi government. Consistent with expectations of voters’ aversion to escalating an international conflict, more aggressive actions such as severing diplomatic ties or suspending arms sales and ending support for Saudi Arabia’s military involvement in Yemen find lower levels of support among scholars. However, if we assume that IR scholars, like voters, have an aversion to escalating an international crisis, why would scholars not overwhelmingly choose the arguably least aggressive response, investigating or holding hearings on Khashoggi’s death?

If only half of IR scholars think sanctions are an effective policy tool, why do three-fourths recommend sanctions against Saudi officials for Khashoggi’s death? Surely it is not because scholars want the U.S. government’s response to be ineffective; almost no respondents selected that the U.S. should do nothing.

Figure 3: Substantive Focus of Top IR Journals (1980-2014)

The fact is, governments are increasingly relying on sanctions to address international conflicts, yet the academy has failed to rigorously study the effectiveness and implications of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. There is not a comprehensive understanding of the implications and effectiveness of the policy both the American public and scholars have overwhelmingly concluded is an appropriate punishment for such a transgression against international norms.

Despite widespread support among the public and scholars for imposing sanctions, policy analysts fear sanctions are an over-used foreign policy tool. In a September 2018 Foreign Affairs article, Peter Harrell notes the “explosion of U.S. sanctions” both in number and scope. Yet, “nobody is quite sure whether they actually work,” writes Adam Taylor in The Washington Post.

The academy has an underdeveloped body of knowledge on the conditions under which sanctions are effective and has failed to develop an understanding of the direct and indirect economic, political and security implications of imposing sanctions on international actors. As sanctions become an increasingly common foreign policy tool deployed by governments to coerce adversaries and punish violations of international norms, scholars should address this under-studied sub-field of international relations.

If you’d like to see more results from the surveys cited above, visit the TRIP Survey Data Dashboard: https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/.

Henry Crossman is a senior at the College of William & Mary, majoring in International Relations and minoring in Economics. He has worked at TRIP for 4 years as a Research Assistant. His interests include African politics, development, and international security.

Climate Change: a Catalyst for the New World Order?

By Moira Johnson

March 11th, 2019

In June of 2017, President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement that had gone into effect only a few months before.

In October of 2017, TRIP fielded Snap Poll X, embedded in a faculty survey. One of the questions asked was “What are the three most important foreign policy issues facing the U.S. today?”

From the graph below, the top three responses were in order: climate change, the rising power of China, and U.S. domestic political instability. While concern over climate change is most likely driven by Trump’s announcement in June, the two other responses coincide nicely with this raised concern.

Upon examining Op-Eds on the topic of climate change, we see that authors agree with scholarly consensus and are in favor of international agreements regarding the mitigation of climate change. Another theme that can be seen throughout these Op-Eds is the large amount of concern about the opportunity that China has to gain in power and international prestige.

It has been evident for quite some time that the U.S. is losing power on the world stage. China has seen this gap as an opportunity to gain prestige using soft power.

Soft power, or the ability to attract and co-opt (rather than coerce) international actors into doing what you want them to do, has been China’s weapon of choice as of late. We can see this through economic initiatives such as the One Belt One Road initiative unveiled in 2013 and pressing for control over shipping lanes in the South China Sea through the use of historical claims. While the US, which outputs 13% of the world’s greenhouse gasses, steps back from supporting international efforts to curb the effects of climate change, China has stepped up and voluntarily made commitments under the Paris Agreement.

While scholars express concern about the rising power of China, they have little fear that the U.S. and China will go to war anytime soon:

Why could that be? In essence, China has found a different theater in which to wage war with its rivals. While it looks as though climate change would come with a heavy price to pay (as one of the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gasses, the decision to back international climate agreements looks as though it would harm many of China’s own industries), it actually doesn’t have a huge impact. The goals are largely unambitious for a country with such large greenhouse gas output. By voluntarily setting goals, China takes a step beyond what many industrialized nations have done and are therefore are able to assert their global power.

Climate change is a pressing issue that will affect our planet for generations to come. It will affect crops in ways that could potentially result in global famine. It will lead to rising sea levels, which in turn will generate climate refugees, adding to the already complex global refugee crisis. In sum, it will affect our planet in ways that will be near impossible to reverse.

While China’s stepping up to battle climate change may only seem to be a small step in helping the planet, could this be a step towards the new world order that emerges following the decline of US post cold war influence? The U.S.’s stepping down from the mantle of global leadership leaves space for China to enhance its global prestige and expand its’ economic clout on the world stage.

If you’d like to see more results from the surveys cited above:

TRIP X Snap Poll (Embedded in the 2017 Faculty Survey) (Fielded in October 2017): https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/questions/44

TRIP Survey Data Dashboard: https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/

Moira Johnson is a junior at the College of William and Mary, majoring in Government and minoring in Physics. She has worked at TRIP since August of 2018. Her interests include Middle Eastern conflicts, Nuclear Proliferation, and the U.S. Intelligence Community.